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Abstract
The paper provides estimates of the effect of economic inequality on middle class well being in
Switzerland. Economic well being is proxied by a person’s satisfaction with his/her income. Two
inequality indicators are used, one standard (the Gini coefficient of the pre-tax income distribution)
and one novel (the number of luxury car registrations per 1000 population). Identification is through
cross-sectional variation of these indicators at various levels of spatial aggregation. Results using data
from the Swiss Household Panel confirm the existence of a robust inverse relationship between inequality
and satisfaction among the middle class.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality is a divisive issue in society. What is seen by some as a useful incentive and a necessary
consequence of a competitive market system is perceived by others as a key shortcoming of capitalism
and a source of social corrosion. To make matters worse, economic theory oscillates between two extreme
positions regarding the desirability of different distributional outcomes. Under ordinal utility, no welfare
rankings of different income distributions are possible, beyond narrow applications of the Pareto principle.
With a cardinal utility function Ui = u(yi), where yi is own income, the usual concavity assumption implies
that, from a distributional perspective, aggregate welfare is maximized under complete income equality.
Other social science disciplines have been more pragmatic on the issue of inequality and well being,
putting evidence ahead of theoretical reasoning. Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) review many studies in
sociology and epidemiology that link income inequality to the quality of social relations, health (including
mental illness) and numerous behavioral outcomes (such as crime, drug use, teenage pregnancy and the
like). Comparing data from different countries, they find for example that rates of mental illness are five
times higher in the most unequal compared to the least unequal societies. In their view, inequality is a
root cause of dysfunctional societies (see also Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).
Of course, such findings are in perfect agreement with the simple utilitarian view positing that overall
welfare is diminished by higher income inequality (for a given mean income). The key is then the concavity
of the well being function and the main driver for the negative association between inequality and aggregate
welfare is the increased degree of deprivation among the poor. By contrast, people in the upper deciles of
the income distribution benefit from higher inequality. Indeed, Rousseau (2008) argues that the stagnation
of aggregate subjective well being in the U.S. since 1975 – as measured by survey responses to happiness
questions – can be attributed to the fact that income gains have accrued disproportionally to the top income
earners and that real incomes have fallen for the poor. The implied increase in happiness inequality is,
however, disputed by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).
An alternative explanation for a negative association between aggregate well being and inequality posits
that inequality lowers personal utility directly, ceteris paribus, for given own income and thus regardless
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of position in the income distribution. In economics, an important proponent of this line of reasoning is
Frank (2007) who argues specifically that inequality is harmful for the middle class. The main theoretical
arguments for such a middle class effect are reviewed in the next section.
While Frank (2007) lists suggestive evidence in support of his claim, a direct test that higher inequality
lowers middle class well being is, to the best of our knowledge, still missing. This paper is an attempt to
fill the gap. Two distinct types of evidence are presented. In a first step, we follow the lead of previous
tests for negative inequality effects based on individual level data, where a measure of individual well being
(happiness, satisfaction) was regressed on the income of a person and on income inequality – typically the
Gini coefficient or a quantile ratio – defined over an appropriate reference region (for example Alesina et
al., 2004, and Schwarze and Ha¨rpfer, 2007). However, in contrast to those earlier papers, we explicitly
focus on middle class individuals, a distinction that is important if the true effect is heterogeneous.
In a second step, we provide evidence on a particular transmission channel emphasized by Frank
(2007). This channel relies on the presence of consumption externalities whereby additional spending
by rich neighbors triggers “keeping up with the Joneses” responses, that lead to overspending and thus
reduced well being by the middle class. Previous evidence includes a study by Kuhn et al. (2008) showing
that neighbors are more likely to upgrade their car if a person won in a lottery. A similar externality was
already noted in an earlier paper by Neumark and Postelwaite (1998) who showed that the probability
of a woman being employed depends positively on her sister-in-law being employed. But even if it is the
case that people change their consumption or employment decisions depending on what others do, it is not
clear a-priori whether this makes them worse off.
The paper addresses this issue more directly: first, we test whether increased income inequality (mea-
sured by the Gini coefficient), or increased conspicuous consumption (measured by the prevalence of luxury
sport cars in the region) reduces subjective well being. This is in the spirit of a number of recent papers
who use the happiness approach for the valuation of intangibles, including Welsch (2002) for pollution,
Berger (2010) for environmental safety, and Welsch (2008) for civil conflict. Secondly, we test whether
increased inequality raises consumption aspirations, proxied by individual’s self-reported information on
the amount of income needed “to make ends meet”.
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All evidence is based on data for Switzerland for the year 2002. Previous studies on happiness in
Switzerland include Frey and Stutzer (2000), Stutzer and Frey, (2006) and Lalive and Stutzer (2010). The
main dataset is an annual household survey, the Swiss Household Panel (Budowski et al., 2001). The survey
has a module on subjective well being, among it a question on the degree of “financial satisfaction” which
is measured on a 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) scale. It also provides information
on household income as well as the “make ends meet” question mentioned before (see also Stutzer, 2004,
for an earlier use of that question to analyze the determinants of income aspirations). Indicators of income
inequality are obtained from external sources. Gini coefficients at various aggregation levels (municipality,
region, canton) were provided by the Federal Tax Office. We obtained car registration data from the
Federal Roads Office, specifically the number of newly registered luxury sports cars (Ferrari and Porsche)
per 1000 population at the regional level.
2 Income Inequality and Personal Utility
In order to explore possible pathways through which income inequality may affect personal utility, we start
with a generalized utility function:
Ui = u(yi, Y ) (1)
where Y is a vector of everyone’s income. Thus, individual utility does depend not only on own income,
but also on the income of others. There are a number of explanations, why Y might matter in the utility
function.
The dominant one is the relative income hypothesis (See Clark et al. (2008) for an extended review of
the relative income literature.) Let the comparison income be given by
y∗i =
∑
j 6=i
δijyj (2)
where δij ≥ 0 and ∑j 6=i δij = 1. Under the relative income hypothesis, Ui = u(yi, y∗i ), where it is assumed
that ∂Ui/∂yi > 0 and ∂Ui/∂y∗i < 0. The same general idea can be captured if income in (1) is replaced by
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consumption. The relative income hypothesis becomes then a relative consumption hypothesis, and we can
write Ui = u(ci, c∗i ), where again ∂Ui/∂c∗i < 0. The typical explanation is that people have the proclivity
of making upward comparisons, i.e. c∗i > ci, and they are the less satisfied the more their consumption or
income falls short of their expectations and aspirations set by the status of the comparison group (Easterlin,
1974, Frank, 2007). It is in this sense that an increased variance of Y or C in the population can have a
negative effect on utility (as it becomes harder to “keep up with the Joneses”, given that they were ahead
and are now even more ahead, in absolute terms).
A variant of the relative income hypothesis replaces comparison income y∗i by income rank such that
Ui = u(yi, rank(yi)). In an extreme version of status dependent preferences, ∂Ui/∂yi = 0 and only rank
matters. The link to inequality is indirect though. For instance, one can argue that an increase in inequality
reinforces the salience of status comparisons, making those of lower ranks worse off. What both approaches
do show is that an increase in everyone’s income does not need to increase aggregate well being (Easterlin,
1974).
A second reason why incomes of others may matter for own utility results from direct utility interde-
pendence, or caring preferences. This argument has been explored by Tomes (1986). Assume that people
derive positive utility from the utility of others whom they care for, or negative utility from the utility of
others whom they envy. Since utilities of others depend on those people’s incomes, these interdependence
effects can be captured by the same utility function (1). An interesting special case arises if the utility
function is additively separable:
Ui = u(yi) +
∑
j 6=i
γijU(yj) (3)
where γ is Edgeworth’s coefficient of effective sympathy. For example, if γij = γ, a Taylor series expansion
of the second term in (3) around mean income gives
Ui = u(yi) + γ(n− 1)U(y¯) + 1/2U ′′(y¯)
∑
j
∑
k
γ(yj − y¯)(yk − y¯) + higher order terms. (4)
With concave utility functions Uj , increased mean income has a positive, and increased income inequality
a negative effect on utility for sympathetic individuals (assuming γ > 0, Tomes, 1986).
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A third potential explanation for the inclusion of others’ income in the utility function is that Y proxies
for the availability of public goods that enter Ui but are not directly controlled for. Examples are the quality
of public services, including schools, price level, crime and anti-social behavior, but also the breadth and
variety of goods and services provided privately. For example, if higher inequality increases crime, reduces
local community social capital and lowers the quality of public services, it will tend to reduce utility mutatis
mutandis.
A fourth channel is related to uncertainty. In the standard model, expected utility is a probability
weighted average of utility in the different states of the world. With concave utility function Ui = u(yi),
this is a decreasing function of income dispersion. Once income is known, the uncertainty is resolved and
the expectation becomes irrelevant. However, in a dynamic view of well being, inequality may matter
for today’s utility, as it provides useful information for forming expectations regarding next year’s income
(which is uncertain). As uncertainty increases with income dispersion, higher inequality will reduce current
utility. This effect can be moderated by individuals’ mobility perspectives, e.g. expectation to move up or
down in the income distribution over time (Senik, 2005)
Last but not least, people may have sentiments of fairness and justice that makes them inequality-averse
pe-se (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). As Thurow (1977) puts it, there can be an “aesthetic taste for equality or
inequality similar in nature to a taste for paintings” (p. 327). One conjecture is that inequality-aversion
is more likely to arise if people perceive the unequal outcomes to be the result of luck rather than effort.
The related concept of deservingness has been recently explored by Oswald and Winkelmann (2008).
3 Data
3.1 Swiss Household Panel
The data employed in this study are part of the fourth wave of the Swiss Household Panel collected in
2002. This dataset is comparable in structure and scope to other European panel household surveys, such
as the German Socio-Economic Panel or the British Household Panel. In 2002, a total of 5’700 individuals
living in 3’582 distinct households were interviewed. For administrative reasons, the merging of regionally
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disaggregated inequality indicators was only feasible for that particular wave, and we are therefore limited
to a cross-sectional analysis. Since inequality indicators are quite persistent, at least over the span of a
few years, the advantage of a genuine panel structure would be limited in any case.
Middle class individuals are identified based on information on household income (net of taxes and after
transfers). For this purpose, the OECD equivalence scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the first household
member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child was employed. All incomes between the
4th and the 9th decile were classified as middle class. After excluding persons younger than 20, and those
older than 70, and dropping the poor (bottom 40%) and the rich (top 10%) the final sample has 2’454
observations.
3.2 Geographic units
Switzerland is composed of about 2’900 municipalities. According to the population census of 2000, they
range in size from 24 inhabitants (Corippo in the Verzasca Vally in Ticino) to 368’875 inhabitants (Zurich).
A total of 1’053 municipalities are represented among participants of the Swiss Household Panel.
The next larger administrative unit are Bezirke. An alternative regional division of Switzerland is based
on so-called spatial mobility (mobilite´ spatiale, or MS) regions. 106 such regions were defined by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office for the original purpose of analyzing spatial mobility between comparable micro
regions (SFSO, 2005).
Finally, Switzerland is a confederation of 26 cantons whose role and political functions pretty closely
resembles that of the States within the U.S.; Again, population sizes vary considerably, from a mere 15’199
in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden to 1.3 million in the canton of Zurich. The geographic delineation
of Swiss cantons is historically determined and sometimes awkward. Many agglomerations straddle canton
borders, and the same holds true for labor markets. The aforementioned spatial mobility regions are an
attempt to better reflect Switzerland’s de-facto division into economically and socially related regions.
The main goal of this paper is to find out whether inequality matters for middle class well being at all.
A secondary objective is to determine whether there are differences depending on the size of the unit for
which inequality is defined. Is it inequality at the municipal level, at the regional level, or rather at the
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cantonal level that matters? Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) reviewed close to 170 papers on the association
between income inequality and health. They found that the strength of evidence for such a link increased
with the size of the comparison region. In particular, local neighborhood results were rather mixed, whereas
income inequality measured over larger areas (regions, states of even countries) produced more unequivocal
results. This finding supports their argument that the effect of inequality works by exacerbating social
hierarchies within the entire society. Deprived neighborhoods have poor health outcomes not because of
their within-inequality, but rather because of their low status relative to other neighborhoods. It is, of
course, an open question whether this argumentation applies equally for the effect of inequality on well
being, rather than health. The “keeping-up-with the Joneses” argument would suggest otherwise.
From a statistical point of view, the trade-off is not clear cut: using smaller areas means having more
observations, and thus more potentially useful variation in the data. On the other hand, some of this
additional variation may be measurement error, which can lead to attenuation bias.
3.3 Measuring income inequality
The income inequality data stem from the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Jeitziner and Peters, 2007).
The SFTA has published Gini coefficients for all municipalities and Cantons of Switzerland, as well as mean
income, median income and number of people living in every municipality, all for the tax year of 2002.
Every Swiss resident with income has to file an annual tax return. Taxable income includes income from
all sources (mainly labor earnings, interest and rental income) but excludes social security contributions
(retirement and unemployment insurance). The income of jointly declaring couples is divided evenly.
The resulting Gini coefficient measures personal income inequality before taxes. This is not ideal, since
utility is usually derived from disposable income, and many of the channels discussed in the previous
section (including reference incomes, altruism and uncertainty) are more appropriately thought of in terms
of post-tax income. However, pre- and post-tax Gini coefficients tend to be highly correlated.
The reason is that the main driving force for pre-tax income inequality is the tax system itself, and in
particular the amount of tax progression which varies between cantons. For example, the 2002 marginal
tax rate (for cantonal and local income tax) for a single person with annual income between 150,000 and
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200,000 was 12.7 percent in the canton of Schwyz, the canton with the highest pre-tax Gini coefficient,
compared to 22.5 percent in the canton of Uri, the canton with the lowest pre-tax Gini (Eidgeno¨ssische
Steuerverwaltung, 2009, p. 11). As a rule, the lower the tax progression the higher pre-tax inequality,
as people with high incomes tend to settle in cantons with low marginal taxes. Across all cantons, the
correlation between marginal tax rates for the 150,000 to 200,000 income bracket and the pre-tax Gini
coefficient was -0.43 in 2002.
Jeitziner and Peters (2007) report Ginis only for the municipal and cantonal levels, but not for the
intermediate regions. We therefore had to construct these missing Ginis using population-weighted averages
of reported Gini coefficients at the municipal level. While such an aggregation introduces error as it neglects
income inequality between municipalities in a region, we found that, when we did the same for the cantonal
level (where the exact Ginis are available for comparison), the error was rather small and unsystematic.
Our second measure of inequality focuses on consumption instead of income. The relative income
mechanisms discussed in the previous section can only work if the reference group income is known to a
person. But even if this is not the case, publicly visible consumption is a strong signal of underlying incomes.
Thus, one can study the effect of income inequality alternatively by studying consumption disparities, and
in particular the effect of high-end, or luxury good, consumption. Of course, the signal will only work if
the consumption of those goods is publicly visible, luxury sport cars being a good example.
−−−−−−see Figure 1 −−−−−−−
We therefore obtained car registration data from the Federal Roads Office for the year 2001. The stock
of cars is not kept on file, so we focus on new registrations of luxury sports cars. We selected two brands,
Ferrari and Porsche. The one year lag makes sure that these cars were visible “on the street” by the time
the survey was taken in 2002.
A total of 1’324 Porsche and Ferrari cars were newly registered in Switzerland during the year 2001.
This corresponds to a ratio of about 0.24 per 1000 population. However, there is pronounced regional and
local variation. The highest registration rate of 0.64 was observed for the Canton of Zug, whereas Berne
had the lowest rate (0.09). The relationship between Gini coefficient and registration rates at the cantonal
level is shown in Figure 2. The correlation coefficient is r = 0.6.
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−−−−−−see Figure 2 −−−−−−−
4 Empirical Modelling and Results
We estimate the effect of inequality on well being by exploiting geographic variation in inequality. Are
those who live in a more unequal municipality/region/canton less satisfied than others, and if so, how large
is the effect of inequality on well being? We would like to estimate the effect “all else equal”, and therefore
use linear regression to account for potential confounders. The most important variable to condition on is
own income. This follows directly from (1) where the inequality effect is defined for a given own income, i.e.
ceteris paribus. In our sample of middle class households, own income and inequality cannot be assumed to
be orthogonal. Rather, middle class incomes will tend to “benefit” from increased inequality. In addition,
the own income effect is interesting in itself, since it provides a natural monetary scale in order to assess
the magnitude of the inequality effects, if any, through equivalent compensating variations.
We report regression results with and without a secondary set of controls. These are individual level
explanatory variables commonly found in the well being literature. They include log-household size, em-
ployment status, gender, a second order polynomial in age, marital status, citizenship and language region.
Some of the previous literature on relative income effects (as exemplified by Luttmer, 2005) has included
spatial average incomes as additional regressor. It is unclear whether this strategy is useful in the present
context. First, even if we limit our attention to the reference income model, mean income is unlikely to be
a valid reference point for middle class people (as most of them will compare themselves with people with
incomes above the mean). Second, if we think that institutions (local authorities) confront the equity-
efficiency trade-off by selecting for example the optimal degree of redistribution, then mean income is
endogenous and we should not control for it. Similarly, the inequality aversion argument does not predict
that mean income should affect well being. By contrast, the altruism model has such a prediction, as
increased mean income should increase well being while increased inequality is predicted to decrease it.
In the data we find a substantial positive correlation of close to 0.5 between mean incomes and Gini
coefficients across cantons. While it is possible in theory to increase the variation of a distribution without
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shifting the mean (mean preserving spread) this is unlikely to happen in practice, where income floors
generate heavily skewed income distributions and increased inequality will primarily result from gains to
the upper percentiles. By the same token it will be hard to disentangle the effects of mean and spread of
income. From the relative income point of view, increases of both Gini and mean income proxy for upward
movements in reference points. In the end, we don’t take a hard stance on the issue but rather provide
both types of evidence, with and without controls for mean income. We tend to find that results without
mean income are more robust.
The absence of panel data precludes the inclusion of regional effects. It is well known that OLS
standard errors of aggregate regressors (such a regional inequality) may be severely downward biased if
errors are correlated within regions. In order to guard against overly optimistic inferences we therefore
report clustered standard errors.
Finally, we should point out that the analysis does not aim at identifying the channel through which
inequality impacts on well being. The previous section listed at least five such causal pathways. Rather,
the objective of this paper is the estimation of the overall net effect. More detailed analyses would require
different data and are thus beyond the present possibilities.
4.1 Income satisfaction
Table 1 shows the estimated regression coefficients and clustering-adjusted standard errors for the two key
variables, logarithm of own income and Gini coefficient in geographic unit and in addition, if included,
the effect of logarithmic mean income. The dependent variable is an individual’s income satisfaction.
Estimates are based on 2402 observations from the Swiss Household Panel. From left to right, there are
two columns each for results at the municipal, regional and cantonal level, respectively.
For example, from the first column we find a Gini estimate of -2.49 (in the top panel without secondary
regression controls) which reduces to -1.97 (in the bottom panel including those socio-demographic char-
acteristics). Both estimates of the municipal level inequality effects are statistically significant. Including
logarithmic mean income changes the municipal estimates to -2.06 and -1.31, respectively. A similar pat-
tern arises for the regional estimates: again the Gini effect exceeds -2 in magnitude except for the model
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including log mean income and secondary controls, where it drops to -1.42. The results confirm our con-
jecture that it is difficult to separate the effects of mean income (which is also negative) and inequality.
When one factor increases in magnitude, the other becomes smaller, and vice versa. In the following, we
therefore concentrate on the models that exclude the log of mean income.
Regardless of specification, the own income effect is large and stable between 1.1 and 1.2, meaning
that an increase in income by 10 percent is predicted to move mean satisfaction by 0.11 to 0.12. Taking a
Gini estimate of -2 as the lower limit of the estimated effect, we thus come to the following quantitative
assessment of the effect of inequality on well being: a rise in the Gini of 18 percentage points, equivalent
to a rise from the Canton with the lowest level of inequality in the sample (Uri) to the Canton with the
highest level of inequality (Schwyz), leads to a fall in mean income satisfaction by at least 0.36 points. This
effect corresponds to a 0.2 standard deviation move in income satisfaction (SD of income satisfaction is
about 2), or a 5% reduction in mean satisfaction, and it is about the same as that of a 30 percent reduction
in personal income.
In Table 2, the Gini coefficient is replaced by the number of luxury cars per 1000 inhabitants that were
newly registered in 2001 in the appropriately defined geographic region. All other specification details are
left unchanged. The key findings are as follows: the luxury car effect is negative throughout, and always
statistically significant; adding secondary controls does not make much of a difference to the magnitude
of the estimated luxury car effect; the log mean income effect is again in a trade off relationship with the
luxury car effect. However, the effect is insignificant in all but one regression, justifying our preference for
a sole inequality indicator.
The size of the coefficient at the municipal level is about -0.4. This estimate indicates that one additional
luxury car registration per 1000 inhabitants lowers predicted financial satisfaction on average by 0.4, or, at
the mean income satisfaction of 7.3, by 5.5 percent. The estimate increases in magnitude when the size of
geographic unit is expanded. It doubles to 0.8 for the regional estimates, and further increases to between
-1 and -1.2 for the canton level estimates. The corresponding effect magnitudes are accordingly larger.
For example, a rise in the cantonal registration rate from the Canton with the lowest rate in the sample
(Berne) to the Canton with the highest rate (Zug) predicts a fall in mean income satisfaction by at least
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−1× 0.54 = −0.54, or 7.4 percent of mean satisfaction.
A possible explanation for the observation that the effect size increases with region size is that mea-
surement error is reduced when aggregation is over larger units. Our measure of new car registrations can
be interpreted as a proxy for the steady state stock of such cars. In small units (at the municipal level)
there are a considerable number of zeros (in 74% of all municipalities, there were no luxury car registered
in 2001) which clearly is a bad indicator of the stock. Second, luxury cars are very mobile by their very
nature, so that it is plausible that the effect of a higher number of such cars is felt at the cantonal level as
well.
To summarize, the two alternative ways of measuring income inequality – either by Gini or by luxury
car prevalence – lead to largely similar conclusions, namely that the income satisfaction of Swiss middle
class individuals is indeed negatively affected by inequality. The model predicts that moving from the
most unequal canton to the least unequal canton in Switzerland entails a more than 5 percent gain in
mean satisfaction.
4.2 Making ends meet
If the middle class feels “squeezed” by increased inequality as they want to keep up with the “Joneses”,
specifically persons ahead of them whose incomes have gone up even more (such as the Trumps, Buffetts
and Gateses), this should be revealed in a positive relationship between inequality and the perceived
“minimum monthly income needed to make ends meet” of “minimum comfort budget”. Table 3 tests this
proposition.
The dependent variable is the response to a make-ends-meet question in the 2002 wave of the Swiss
Household Panel. This question is answered only by the household head, reducing the number of observa-
tions to 1472. The average response was 5157 Swiss Francs, or 2370 Franks per capita.
The organization of results is similar to that of the previous section. A total of twelve separate regres-
sions were performed, with and without secondary controls, for the three geographic units, and for the two
inequality indicators, Gini coefficient and number of luxury cars per 1000 population. The first two rows
of the top and bottom panels of Table 3 show the estimated coefficients of household size and own income
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(both entered on a logarithmic scale). These are largely unaffected by the specification. The estimated
elasticity of the required income with respect to household size is about 0.4; the own income elasticity is
slightly higher, about 0.45. For each percent increase in own income, the subjective amount required to
make ends meet goes up by 0.45 percent, clear evidence of income adaptation and shifting income norms.
This estimate is almost identical to the 0.43 elasticity reported by Stutzer (2004) for Switzerland based on
a different dataset and a different year (data collected between 1992 and 1994).
As to the inequality indicators, we find overwhelming and robust evidence that middle class household
heads adjust their response to the make-ends-meet question upward as inequality goes up. Statistically
significant effects are found at all three geographic reference levels, although the estimated magnitude is
somewhat smaller at the municipal level compared to the region or canton.
Take the regional effects as an example. The point estimates of the Gini coefficient are 0.65 and 0.48,
depending on whether secondary explanatory variables are included or not. Therefore, a Gini move from
0.3 to 0.5 is predicted to increase the required income amount by at least 10 percent. Similarly, considering
the number of luxury cars instead, the regional coefficients are 0.17 and 0.13, respectively. Adding half
a luxury car per 1000 population is thus predicted to increase the required income by at least 7 percent.
These effects are both statistically significant and economically substantial.
5 Conclusions
What are the social costs of inequality? While common sense suggests that increasing economic inequality
unequivocally harms the poor, it may or may not benefit the middle class and those who are even better
off. Theoretical arguments can be put forward on either side, and the answer thus ultimately must be an
empirical one.
We provided in this paper such empirical evidence, using Swiss data on individual well being and
inequality and regression analysis. Two inequality indicators were used, one standard (the Gini coefficient of
the pre-tax income distribution) and one novel (the number of luxury car registrations per 1000 population).
Results are strongly suggesting that the middle class is indeed adversely affected by inequality. On one
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hand, increased inequality lowers income satisfaction of middle class individuals, ceteris paribus, for given
own income. On the other hand, inequality increases the income amount that household heads deem
necessary to make ends meet. Both effects are statistically significant and economically substantial.
Our findings may be useful for reassessing the optimal choice along the equity/efficiency trade-off. They
also contribute an explanation why aggregate well being in growing but increasingly unequal societies has
been stagnating.
14
6 References
Alesina, Alberto, Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch (2004) Inequality and happiness: are Europeans
and Americans different? Journal of Public Economics 88, 2009-2042.
Berger, Eva (2010) The Chernobyl Disaster, Concern about the Environment, and Life Satisfaction,
Kyklos 63, 18.
Budowski, Monica, Robin Tillmann, Erwin Zimmermann, Boris Wernli, Annette Scherpenzeel, and Alexis
Gabadinho (2001) The Swiss Household Panel 1999-2003: Data for research on micro-social change,
ZUMA-Nachrichten, 50, 100-125.
Clark, Andrew E., Paul Frijters and Michael H. Shields (2008a) Relative Income, Happiness and Utility:
An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles, Journal of Economic Literature 46,
95-144.
Easterlin, Richard A. (1974) Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence.
In Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, ed. Paul
A. David and Melvin W. Reder. New York: Academic Press, 89125.
Eidgeno¨ssische Steuerverwaltung (2009) Steuerbelastung in den Kantonshauptorten 2002. Bern.
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 3, 817-868.
Frank, Robert H. (2007) Falling Behind? How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle-Class, University of
California Press.
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2000) Happiness, Economy and Institutions. Economic Journal 110,
918-938.
Jeitziner, Bruno and Rudi Peters (2007) Regionale Einkommens- und Vermo¨gensverteilung in der Schweiz:
Was sagen die Steuerdaten? Die Volkswirtschaft, issue 12.
15
Kuhn, Peter J., Peter Kooreman, Adriaan R. Soetevent and Arie Kapteyn (2008) The Own and Social
Effects of an Unexpected Income Shock Evidence from the Dutch Postcode Lottery, Rand Working
Paper WR-574
Lalive, Rafel and Alois Stutzer (2010) Approval of Equal Rights and Gender Differences in Well-Being,
forthcoming in the Journal of Population Economics.
Luttmer, Erzo F.P. (2005) Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well being, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 120, 963-1002.
Neumark, David and Andrew Postelwaite (1998) Relative income concerns and the rise in married women’s
employment, Journal of Public Economics 70, 157193.
Oswald, Andrew J. and Rainer Winkelmann (2008) Delay and Deservingness after Winning the Lottery,
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute Working Paper No 0815.
Rousseau, Jean-Benoˆıt G. (2008) Happiness and Income Inequality, mimeo., University of Michigan.
Schwarze, Johannes and Marco Ha¨rpfer (2007) Are People Inequality Averse, and do they prefer redistri-
bution by the state? Journal of Socio-Economics 36, 233-249.
Senik, Claudia (2005) Income distribution and well-being: what can we learn from subjective data?
Journal of Economic Literature 19, 43-63.
SFSO (2005)Eidgeno¨ssische Volksza¨hlung 2000: Die Raumgliederung der Schweiz, Neuenburg: Swiss Fed-
eral Statistical Office.
Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers (2008) Happiness Inequality in the United States, Journal of Legal
Studies, 37, S33-S79.
Stutzer, Alois (2004) The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 54, 89-109.
16
Stutzer, Alois and Bruno S. Frey (2006) Political participation and procedural utility: An empirical study,
European Journal of Political Research 45, 391418.
Thurow, Lester C. (1971) The income distribution as a pure public good, Quarterly Journal of Economics
85, 327-336.
Tomes, Nigel (1986) Income distribution, happiness and satisfaction: A direct test of the interdependent
preferences model, Journal of Economic Psychology 7, 425-446.
Welsch, Heinz (2002) Preferences over Prosperity and Pollution:Environmental Valuation Based on Hap-
piness Surveys, Kyklos 55, 473494.
Welsch, Heinz (2008) The Social Costs of Civil Conflict: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness, Kyklos 61,
320-340.
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Kate E. Pickett (2006) Income inequality and population health: a review
and explanation of the evidence, Social Science & Medicine 62, 1768-1784.
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Kate E. Pickett (2009) The spirit level: why more equal societies almost always
do better, London: Allen Lane.
17
Table 1. Income satisfaction of middle class and inequality (n=2402)
Gini and mean income at level of...
Municipality Region Canton
without controls
Log own income 1.09∗ 1.10∗ 1.07∗ 1.09∗ 1.06∗ 1.08∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)
Gini coefficient -2.49∗ -2.06∗ -2.78∗ -2.01∗ -2.29∗ -1.49
(0.74) (0.90) (0.85) (0.95) (1.18) (1.14)
Log average income -0.28 -0.48 -0.78
(0.27) (0.30) (0.29)
with controls1
Log own income 1.20∗ 1.23∗ 1.19∗ 1.22∗ 1.18∗ 1.21∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Gini coefficient -1.97∗ -1.31 -2.14∗ -0.99 -1.42 -0.37
(0.69) (0.84) (0.61) (0.85) (1.01) (0.85)
Log average income -0.42 -0.69∗ -0.94∗
(0.26) (0.28) (0.30)
Dependent variable: income satisfaction
1Controls include log-household size, employment status, gender, a second order
polynomial in age, marital status, citizenship and language region.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the aggregate regressors.
∗ indicates 5%-statistical significance.
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Table 2. Income satisfaction of middle class and conspicuous consumption (n=2355)
# of new luxury cars/1000 pop. and mean income at level of...
Municipality Region Canton
without controls
Log own income 1.10∗ 1.12∗ 1.07∗ 1.08∗ 1.07∗ 1.08∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)
# of new luxury cars/1000 pop. -0.39∗ -0.32∗ -0.77∗ -0.52 -1.16∗ -0.75
(0.13) (0.16) (0.29) (0.43) (0.45) (0.47)
Log average income -0.30 -0.34 -0.49
(0.28) (0.44) (0.32)
with controls1
Log own income 1.23∗ 1.26∗ 1.20∗ 1.22∗ 1.19∗ 1.21∗
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
# of new luxury cars/1000 pop. -0.37∗ -0.29∗ -0.78∗ -0.43 -0.98∗ -0.32
(0.13) (0.15) (0.24) (0.40) (0.42) (0.46)
Log average income -0.36 -0.48 -0.79∗
(0.26) (0.39) (0.36)
Dependent variable: income satisfaction
1Controls include log-household size, employment status, gender, a second order
polynomial in age, marital status, citizenship and language region.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the aggregate regressors.
∗ indicates 5%-statistical significance.
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Table 3. Amount needed to make ends meet (n=1472)
Municipality Region Canton
Gini coefficient
Log household size 0.39∗ 0.36∗ 0.40∗ 0.37∗ 0.40∗ 0.36∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log own income 0.43∗ 0.44∗ 0.44∗ 0.45∗ 0.44∗ 0.45∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Gini coefficient 0.34∗ 0.27∗ 0.65∗ 0.48∗ 0.59∗ 0.37
(0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.31) (0.28)
Secondary controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
# of luxury cars/1000 pop.
Log household size 0.39∗ 0.36∗ 0.40∗ 0.36∗ 0.39∗ 0.36∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log own income 0.44∗ 0.45∗ 0.44∗ 0.45∗ 0.44∗ 0.45∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
# of luxury cars/1000 pop. 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.17∗ 0.13∗ 0.20∗ 0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11)
Secondary controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Dependent variable: logarithm of “amount needed to make ends meet”.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the aggregate regressors.
∗ indicates 5%-statistical significance.
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Fig 1. Cantonal ranking in luxury car registrations per 1000 pop., 2001
Source: Federal Roads Office, own calculations.
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Fig. 2. Income Inequality and Luxury Car Registrations, by Canton
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